

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 INR-07 SS-15 /035 W

----- 110830

R 261232Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECDEF WASHDC//ISA(SA)/DSAA//

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2595

JCS WASHDC

USCINCEUR//ECJ4/7-SAME//

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 1339

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KU

SUBJ: TRAINING OF KUWAITI AIR CADETS

REF: A. SECDEF 272304Z FEB 75

B. KUWAIT 1145 DTG 120950Z MAR 75

C. SECDEF 7225 DTG 211803Z MAR 75

D. KUWAIT 0796 DTG 021000Z MAR 74

E. SECDEF 5200 DTG 082055Z MAR 74

F. KUWAIT 0810 DTG 190743Z FEB 75

G. KUWAIT 2085 DTG 260632Z MAY 74

1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR HELPFUL (REFTEL A) EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN EXTENT AND METHOD COSTING, ETC OF USN VS USAF PILOT TRAINING. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE USN PILOT TRAINING CASE HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOK, AND THE CADETS ARE NOW IN CONUS. NEVERTHELESS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS REINFORCED GENERAL CONCERN I EXPRESSED IN KUWAIT--THAT OUR PILOT TRAINING OFFERS SO FAR TO GOK ARE ENTIRELY INADEQUATE, RPT INADEQUATE.

2. THE PROBLEM OF THE CADETS CURRENTLY IN USAF UPT REMAINS AS DISCUSSED IN REFTEL (B). WHILE THE LATEST PILOT TRAINING WILL PROVIDE SOME PILOTS FOR THE A4, TOTAL QUANTITIES WILL STILL BE FAR SHORT OF DESIRED QUANTITIES. KAF DESIRES 1.5 PILOTS PER SEAT, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE APPROX 60 A4 PILOTS. WE BELIEVE THIS MANNING TO BE MEAGER IN COMPARISON WITH US PRACTICE. (US MANNING DOCUMENTS CALL FOR 82 PILOTS FOR TWO-20 PLANE A4  
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SQUADRONS, PLUS HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES.)

3. USG PROBLEMS AS STATED IN REFTEL (A) AND (C) OF PROVIDING TIMELY A4 TRANSITION OR OTHER OPERATIONAL TRAINING ARE NOT TOTALLY UNAPPRECIATED BY US. EMBASSY KUWAIT DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THIS BROAD PICTURE AND CANNOT MAKE THE JUDGEMENTS INVOLVED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT PROGRAMS OF THE SIZE OF THE GOK A4 AND IHAWK CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN IMPACT ON US TRAINING SCHEDULES. IN THIS ERA OF FISCAL AUSTERITY, I AM SURE ANY UNUSED OR SURPLUS CAPACITY HAS BEEN DISCOVERED AND ELIMINATED. LOCALLY, HOWEVER, WE MUST ASSUME THAT THESE MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED BEFORE THE USG MADE THE OFFERS.

4. WE CONCUR WITH BASIC RECOMMENDATION OF PARA 6 REFTEL (C). HOWEVER, THE KAF HAS SOME VERY REAL PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS. TO START WITH, THE ONLY NON-KUWAITI PILOTS FLYING WITH THE KAF ARE 2 CIVILIANS (2 USAF TRAINED PAKISTANIS), AND FOUR SECONDED UK (RAF) OFFICERS. ALL ARE USED AS FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS. GOK IS WILLING TO USE USAF UPT GRADS WITH THEIR UK/FRENCH AIRCRAFT INSTEAD OF A4; HOWEVER, THEY HAVE FOUR PROBLEMS IN THIS MATTER: (1) THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT AIRSPACE FOR AIR TO AIR FIRING (KUWAIT IS A SMALL COUNTRY AND THE ARABIAN/PERSIAN GULF IS HEAVILY TRAVELLED BY SHIPPING); (2) THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR PILOTS; (3) THE OUTPUT OF USAF UPT IS NOT A TRAINED FIGHTER PILOT; AND (4) TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS PER MONTH PER PILOT ARE CURRENTLY AVERAGING 15 FOR HUNTER/LIGHTNING AND 15-20 FOR STRIKEMASTER (WITH A TOTAL OF 27 ACTUALLY FLYING). WHILE RECEIPT OF THE MIRAGES (IF THEY COME TO KUWAIT) WITH OR WITHOUT DISPOSAL OF THE DECREPIT HUNTERS WILL IMPROVE THE SITUATION, DOUBLING THE NUMBERS OF PILOTS WILL STILL PULL THE AVERAGE DOWN TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

5. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AN ACTUAL COMMITMENT WAS MADE IS A GOOD ONE. REFTEL (D) INDICATES THAT THE REQUIREMENT WAS MADE KNOWN BY THE KAF AND REFTEL (E) ACKNOWLEDGES THE REQUIREMENT. THE KAF BELIEVES A COMMITMENT WAS MADE AND THE DOCUMENTARY RECORDS APPEARS STRONGLY TO SUPPORT THIS INFERENCE. IN ADDITION, REFTEL (G) REQUESTED QUOTE PLANNING FOR STUDY OF AVAILABLE PILOT TRAINING SPACES AND FMS CASE. END QUOTE. SINCE LATE OCT 74, IT HAS APPEARED THAT MATTER WOULD BE TAKEN CARE OF UNDER A4 PROGRAM. MATTER HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED SINCE, UNTIL RAISED IN FEB 75, CONFIDENTIAL

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AS REPORTED IN REFTEL (F). LOCALLY, IT APPEARS TO US THAT A COMMITMENT WAS RECOGNIZED AND MADE.

6. OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOK IS A NEW AND STILL UNDEFINED ONE. BEING NEW, THERE HAS NOT BEEN THE USUAL COOPERATIVE PLANNING WHICH IS THE RESULT OF FAMILIARTIY WITH HOW WE DO THINGS. ELSEWHERE, WE HAVE ASSISTED OUR FRIENDS OVER MANY YEARS DURING WHICH TIME WE HAD SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE THROUGH

CONTROL OF GRANT AID. HERE, OUR PROCEDURES ARE STRANGE AND WE DO NOT HAVE THE CONTROL THAT GOES WITH GRANT AID.

7. I WISH I COULD PREDICT SMOOTH AND ORDERLY PLANNING WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE PART OF THE KUWAITIS. REALISTICALLY, I MUST FORECAST A PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE OR TWO YEARS OF MINOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT. WE MUST RECOGNIZE OUR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE KUWAITIS IS, BASICALLY, UNPLANNED. THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS UNTIL ENOUGH TIME PASSES FOR THEM TO RECOGNIZE THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND FOR THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE PLANNED WITHIN OUR SYSTEM. WE IN EMBASSY KUWAIT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEM AND HAVE MADE REQUESTS FOR US (DOD) PERSONNEL TO ASSIST THE GOK WITH PLANNING. POLICY DECISIONS HAVE MOVED SLOWLY, AND WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY PRUDENT FOR LONG-TERM, THIS DELIBERATE PACE HAS NOT EASED OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS.

8. IN THIS INTERIM PERIOD, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE SITUATION FOR WHAT IT IS AND TRY TO PRODUCE ORDERLY/COOPERATIVE PLANNING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO WORK OUT THE PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE, BEING SCRUPULOUSLY CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND REPUTATION OF THE USG. IF WE ARE GOING TO GET INVOLVED, IT MUST BE DONE IN A CREDITABLE AND EXEMPLARY FASHION AS VIEWED BY THE KUWAITIS IF OUR EFFORTS ARE NOT TO WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE. I BELIEVE WE MUST FOLLOW THROUGH ON A4 KU AND IHAWK TRAINING PROGRAMS EVEN THOUGH, OCCASIONALLY, IT WILL BE INCONVENIENT FOR US. IT IS OUR INFLUENCE, CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION WHICH WILL SUFFER IF WE DO NOT FOLLOW THROUGH IN A CREDITABLE MANNER.  
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## Message Attributes

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